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CREEPING ASSET ACQUISITIONS AFTER
TEFRA: ON RECONCILING THE
IRRECONCILABLE
by
Jerred G. Blanchard, Jr.*
HE manner in which the step-transaction doctrine applies to a
"creeping" asset acquisition, that is, an acquisition of target stock
followed by the acquisition of the assets of the target, and the fed-
eral income tax consequences incident to such application have long been
troublesome to both tax counselors and administrators. Substantial confu-
sion and uncertainty result from the apparent paradox that, for purposes of
the reorganization provisions of the Code,' the courts appear to have ap-
plied a fairly loose formulation of the step-transaction doctrine in deter-
mining whether a creeping asset acquisition should be tested as a stock or
asset reorganization; 2 for purposes of the complete liquidation provisions
of the Code,3 however, courts have applied either a very strict construction
of the step-transaction doctrine 4 or have found the step-transaction doc-
trine wholly inapplicable. 5 The confusion and uncertainty is compounded
by doubt regarding the question of whether the complete liquidation and
reorganization provisions can have concurrent application to a given trans-
action or whether one set of provisions preempts the other.6 The problem
* B.A., Yale University; J.D., Vanderbilt University; LL.M. (Taxation), New York
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1. See I.R.C. §§ 354, 356, 357, 358, 361, 362, 368 (1982).
2. See King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 331-338 (1982).
4. Under the Code the only formulation of the step-transaction doctrine that could
apply in the complete liquidation context would appear to be either the "binding commit-
ment" test, as illustrated by Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968), or the "mutual
interdependence" test, as illustrated by American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.
397, 405 (1948), aft'dper curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920
(1950).
5. The question of whether the repeal of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C. 74, ayf'dper curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951),
has completely eliminated the application of the step-transaction doctrine for purposes of
the complete liquidation provisions is discussed infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
6. See General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir.
1980); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959); Performance Sys., Inc. v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 525, 534
(M.D. Tenn. 1973), afj'dper curiam, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1974); FEC Liquidating Corp.
v. United States, 548 F.2d 924, 926-27 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Kass v. Commissioner (May B. Kass),
60 T.C. 218, 222-23 (1973), affd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(d)
(1955).
1053
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
is further complicated by the fact that, even if a creeping asset acquisition
is tested as an asset acquisition for purposes of the reorganization provi-
sions, the manner in which the continuity of proprietary interest test is
applied to the transaction is not always clear.7
The succeeding analysis does not purport to resolve all of the problems
surrounding creeping asset acquisitions under current law. Rather, by
carefully focusing upon the issues and pertinent authorities, a few conclu-
sions may be drawn that will perhaps aid others in their search for the
principles that should be applied in determining the tax consequences of
creeping asset acquisitions.
I. THE STEP-TRANSACTION DOCTRINE
The so-called "step-transaction doctrine" is a specific application of the
broad proposition that the substance of a transaction governs its tax conse-
quences. The general question addressed by the doctrine is "[w]hether to
accord the separate steps of a complex transaction independent signifi-
cance, or to treat them as related steps in a unified transaction."'8 The
courts generally have recognized three standards for determining whether
separate steps must be treated as a single transaction for tax purposes:
(1) the "end result" test, which combines two steps if the second step was
intended at the time the first step was taken; 9 (2) the "mutual interdepen-
dence" test, which combines two steps if, but for the second step, the first
step would have been fruitless;' 0 and (3) the "binding commitment" test,
which combines two steps if a binding commitment to take the second step
was present at the time the first step was taken."l  Each time a court is
asked by the taxpayer or the government to treat a series of transactions as
a single transaction, the court must decide which formulation, if any, of
the step-transaction doctrine should be applied in light of the policy under-
lying the taxing statute being scrutinized. 12
7. The confusion regarding continuity of interest involves the case in which the acquir-
ing corporation owns a substantial block of "old and cold" stock of the target corporation.
The law is unclear as to whether continuity is tested solely by reference to the outsiders'
target stock, or if continuity is tested by reference to all of the stock of the target, whether the
acquiring corporation's "old and cold" target stock will be deemed to have been exchanged
for qualifying consideration. Cf. Kass v. Commissioner (May B. Kass), 60 T.C. 218, 222,
223 (1973) (acquiring corporation's "old and cold" stock contributes to continuity of inter-
est), af'd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); Warner Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1225, 1227
(1932) (reference to outsiders' target stock).
8. King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. CI. 1969).
9. See id.
10. See American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, I I T.C. 397, 405 (1948), arffidper
curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
11. See Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
12. In King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 518 (Ct. Cl. 1969), the
Court of Claims expressly adopted the end result test for purposes of deciding whether a
stock acquisition followed by an upstream merger should be "collapsed" and treated as a
type A reorganization. In McDonald's v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 997-98 (1981), rev'd
sub nom. McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982),
the Tax Court expressly adopted the mutual interdependence test for purposes of determin-
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A. In the Context of the Complete Liquidation Provisions
Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the most
significant case applying the step-transaction doctrine to complete liquida-
tions was Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner. 13 In Kimbell-Di-
amond P purchased all of the stock of T14 for the sole purpose of acquiring
T's milling plant to replace P's plant, which had been destroyed by fire.
Shortly after the stock purchase, T was completely liquidated. P took the
position that the adjusted basis of the T assets that P received in the liqui-
dation constituted a carryover basis under the complete liquidation provi-
sions of the 1939 Code. The Tax Court, agreeing with the government,
concluded that "[t]he purchase of [T's] stock and its subsequent liquidation
must be considered as one transaction, namely, the purchase of. . .assets
which was [P's] sole intention."' 5 Thus, the Tax Court held that the proper
basis for T's assets in the hands of P was a cost basis, which was considera-
bly lower than the carryover basis reported by P.16
While the Tax Court apparently did not make a conscious decision to
apply any particular formulation of the step-transaction doctrine to the
facts of Kimbell-Diamond, the end result test was probably applied. The
language quoted above indicates that the Tax Court viewed the stock
purchase and liquidation as a single transaction because P's sole intention
in acquiring the T stock was the acquisition of T's assets.17 The end result
test, therefore, was applied by the courts for purposes of determining the
tax consequences of a creeping asset acquisition under the liquidation pro-
visions of the 1939 Code.' 8
ing whether a merger followed by a cash sale of the acquiring company stock issued in the
merger should be "collapsed" and treated as a cash merger.
13. 14 T.C. 74, afdper curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827
(1951).
14. For ease of reference, the purchasing or parent corporation generally will be called
"P," the target corporation generally will be called "1," and, occasionally, "S" will play the
role of a wholly owned subsidiary of P.
15. 14 T.C. at 80.
16. Id. at 80-81.
17. An argument could be made that under the circumstances the acquisition of the T
stock would have been "fruitless" but for the subsequent acquisition of the T assets, given
P's overwhelming need for a new milling plant following the destruction of its own plant.
Thus, the creeping acquisition in Kimbell-Diamond may have satisfied the mutual interde-
pendence test. In United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1960), the court
applied the Kimbell-Diamond rule to an acquisition in which a going business was acquired
under less dire circumstances because P acquired the T stock for the sole purpose of acquir-
ing the business. Accord North American Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 677, 691
(1960) (Kimbell-Diamond applicable to going business reorganized). Accordingly, the courts
clearly have construed Kimbell-Diamond as an end result case.
18. Although the Kimbell-Diamond decision may be a dead letter in creeping acquisi-
tions by corporations under current law, it may have continuing vitality for purposes of
applying § 331 in the context of creeping acquisitions by individuals. Thus, if an individual,
or group of individuals, acquires the stock of a corporation for the sole purpose of acquiring
its assets, the transaction may be treated as an asset purchase. The purchaser recognizes no
gain or loss on the liquidation and acquires a basis in Ts assets equal to the cost of the stock.
See Snively v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 266, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1955); E.T. Griswold v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C. 463, 472 (1966), afd, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968); Estate of Suter v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 244, 258-59 (1957).
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The enactment of TEFRA19 in 1982 conclusively answered the question
of the vitality of Kimbell-Diamond under current law. Prior to TEFRA,
the government and all courts considering the question, with the exception
of the Court of Claims,20 held the subjective end result test overruled by
the enactment of section 334(b)(2) in 1954.21 Congress eliminated any
doubt as to the vitality of Kimbell-Diamond by adding to the Code section
338, which, according to the Senate Finance Committee Report, 22 was in-
tended to overrule Kimbell-Diamond. The enactment of TEFRA, there-
fore, clearly made the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine a dead letter in the
context of creeping acquisitions to which section 332, by its terms,
applies.2 3
The repeal of Kimbell-Diamond arguably does not prevent the applica-
tion of the end result test for purposes of sections 331, 336, and 337 in the
case of corporate creeping acquisitions to which section 332 of the Code
cannot apply. For example, suppose P purchases for cash 75% of the stock
of T for the sole purpose of acquiring T's operating assets. Shortly thereaf-
ter, T adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distributes, in complete
19. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 [hereinafter cited as
TEFRA], Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. (1982)).
20. American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 94, 198 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
Several commentators agreed with the Court of Claims' view that § 334(b)(2) did not pre-
empt Kimbell-Diamond on the theory that § 334(b)(2) was enacted as a safe haven for tax-
payers desiring a cost basis rather than as the sole method of obtaining a cost basis. See
Levin & Bowen, Taxable and Tax-Free Two-Step Acquisitions and Minority Squeeze-Outs, 33
TAx L. REV. 425, 460 (1978); Mopsick, Yoc Heating Corp. and Two-Step Asset Acquisitions, I
J. CORP. TAx'N 235, 240-41 (1974); Pugh, Combining Acquired and Acquiring Corporations
and Their Subsidiaries Following a Purchase of Stock." Some Anomalies of Form and Sub-
stance, 35 TAX L. REV. 359, 362-71 (1980). In the post-TEFRA world, the merits of this
argument are of purely academic interest.
21. See Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Director, 614 F.2d 990, 999 (5th Cir. 1980); Inter-
national State Bank v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 173, 181 (1978); Kansas Sand & Concrete,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 522, 529 (1971), af'd, 462 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1972). The
theory underlying the decisions that § 334(b)(2) preempts Kimbell-Diamondis that Congress
must have intended form to control given the highly technical, or formal, requirements of
§ 334(b)(2). In this regard, these decisions parallel those cases holding that § 332, by virtue
of its highly technical requirements, is "elective," in the sense that a taxpayer may avoid or
invoke § 332by either complying with, or failing to comply with, its provisions. See Granite
Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (Ist Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Day & Zimmer-
man, Inc., 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945); Rev. Rul. 60-262, 1960-2 C.B. 114.
22. S. REP. No. 494,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 192, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 281.
23. One might argue that the enactment of § 338 "killed" Kimbell-Diamond only for
purposes of determining the adjusted basis of T's assets in the hands of P and that, for other
purposes, Kimbell-Diamond still lives. For example, assume: (1) P owns, on an "old and
cold" basis, 21% of the stock of T; (2) P purchases for cash the remaining 79% of T's stock;
and (3) P dissolves T in accordance with preexisting intent. One could argue that, for pur-
oses of § 332, P must be treated as having purchased 79% of T's assets for cash and as
aving acquired the balance in exchange for 21% of T's stock. Under this analysis P would
recognize gain or loss under § 331 with respect to the 21% of T's stock owned by P on an
"old and cold" basis, but, due to the repeal of Kimbell-Diamond for basis purposes, would
acquire a carryover basis in 100% of T's assets. Such an analysis is rebutted by the express
language of § 334(b), which conditions the carryover basis provision on the application of
§ 332. Thus, the repeal of Kimbell-Diamond clearly entails the nonapplication of at least the
end result formulation of the step-transaction doctrine in the context of a complete liquida-
tion to which § 332, by its terms, applies.
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liquidation, 75% of its assets, solely operating assets, to P and 25% of its
assets, unneeded cash, to the minority shareholders of T. If the repeal of
Kimbell-Diamond does not mean that, for purposes of the complete liqui-
dation provisions of the Code, the transactions must be respected as a
stock purchase by P followed by the complete liquidation of T, P might be
viewed as having purchased T's operating assets rather than 75% of T's
stock. Because T did not adopt a plan of complete liquidation until after P
parted with its cash, the government might succeed in contending that sec-
tion 337 cannot apply to the deemed sale of T's operating assets to p.24
Thus, if Kimbell-Diamond still lives in the context of creeping acquisitions
to which section 332 cannot apply, T might be treated as having made a
taxable sale of 75% of its assets to P.
For at least two reasons, most experienced tax practitioners will con-
clude that T should not be deemed to have made a taxable sale of 75% of
its assets to P under the facts described above. First, the sale of 75% of the
T stock was by the stockholders of T and not by T. In all likelihood the
75% stockholders of T negotiated the sale of their shares to P for their own
benefit, not on behalf of T. In addition, the T stock owned by T's share-
holders is not, and never has been, an asset of T or an asset that could be
sold by T. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v.
Cumberland Public Service Co.,25 therefore, an asset sale should not be im-
puted to T.
The most convincing reason for not treating T as having made a taxable
sale of 75% of its assets, however, lies in the repeal of Kimbell-Diamond If
P had purchased for cash 80% of the stock of T, solely for the acquisition
of T's operating assets, and had then completely liquidated T, the repeal of
Kimbell-Diamond would mandate that P receive a carryover basis in the
assets of T pursuant to section 334(b)(1). This result obtains only if, as
expressly required by section 334(b)(1), the transfer of T's assets to P con-
stitutes a complete liquidation to which section 332(a) applies. Once the
government concedes that section 332 applies to the liquidation of T, the
government would be hard put to deny section 336's jurisdiction over the
distribution of T's assets to P. Thus, section 336 clearly applies to the case
in which P purchases 80% of the T stock. Conditioning tax consequences
to T solely upon the number of shares of T's stock P is able to purchase
serves no tax policy.26 Accordingly, the repeal of Kimbell-Diamond should
entail the elimination of the end result test for purposes of applying sec-
tions 331 through 338 to creeping asset acquisitions by corporations, re-
gardless of the percentage of T stock acquired by P.
24. Similarly, § 337 would not apply if T is a collapsible corporation or if the liquida-
tion of T is completed more than one year after T adopts the plan of complete liquidation.
See I.R.C. § 337(a), (c)(l) (1982).
25. 338 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1950). Of course, Cumberland Public Service should be com-
pared to the case in which T negotiates the sale of its assets. See Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333-34 (1945).
26. See Rose Ann Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 468, 472-73 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), for similar considerations in solving the §§ 351/304 overlap
under pre-TEFRA law.
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Labelling Kimbell-Diamond a dead letter does not mean that no formu-
lation of the step-transaction doctrine applies in the context of the liquida-
tion provisions. As noted above, the court in Kimbell-Diamond seems to
have applied the end result formulation of the step-transaction doctrine.
By repealing Kimbell-Diamond with the enactment of section 338, Con-
gress apparently left open the question of whether the mutual interdepen-
dence or binding commitment formulation of the step-transaction doctrine
applies in the context of the liquidation provisions. If, at the time that P
purchases all of T's stock, P is under a binding obligation to completely
liquidate T, a court quite conceivably would treat the transaction as a
purchase of T's assets. As a general proposition, however, after the enact-
ment of TEFRA, P's transitory ownership of T stock clearly will be recog-
nized for purposes of the liquidation provisions of the Code,
notwithstanding P's acquisition of the T stock for the sole purpose of ob-
taining T's assets.
B. In the Context of the Reorganization Provisions
In stark contrast to the recent authorities addressing the application of
the step-transaction doctrine in the context of the complete liquidation
provisions, the weight of authority seems to indicate that the end result test
applies for purposes of determining whether a creeping asset acquisition
should be tested as an asset or stock reorganization. 27 Holding that a stock
acquisition followed by an upstream merger must be collapsed and treated
as an "A" reorganization described in section 368(a)(1)(A), the Court of
Claims in King Enterprises stated: "Purportedly separate transactions will
be amalgamated into a single transaction when it appears that they were
really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to
be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result."'2 8 Thus, if P
intends to acquire the assets of T simultaneously with the acquisition of
the stock of T, for purposes of the reorganization provisions of the Code, P
may be treated as having acquired the T assets in exchange for the consid-
eration P transferred in exchange for the stock of T. If such consideration
27. The most frequently cited example of the treatment of a creeping asset acquisition
as an asset reorganization, or a statutory merger, is King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,
418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969). King Enterprises held that an upstream merger following a stock
acquisition, in which more than 50% of the consideration was P stock, qualified as a type A
reorganization because the upstream merger was intended at the time that the stock was
acquired. Id at 519. Other cases have applied the end result test in similar circumstances
for purposes of determining whether an acquisition qualified as a reorganization. See
Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 457 (1938); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, 115
F.2d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941); Commissioner v. Dana, 103
F.2d 359, 362 (3d Cir. 1939); Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 975, 985-86 (1956);
Robert Campbell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 312, 320-21 (1950); Rev. Rul. 76-123, 1976-1
C.B. 95; Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141.
28. 418 F.2d at 516; see also Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 83-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) $ 9320, at 86,825 (5th Cir. 1983) (court stated that both end result and mutual inter-
dependence tests apply in this context); Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156 (government ap-
parently adopted hybrid end result and mutual interdependence test in reorganization
context).
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satisfies the continuity of proprietary interest test, and P acquires the assets
of T in a state law merger, then the transaction would qualify as an A
reorganization.
Three decisions seem to hold the end result formulation inapplicable in
the context of the reorganization provisions. In Commissioner v. Gordon29
the Supreme Court held that a series of two or more distributions of stock
of a subsidiary could be treated as a single distribution for purposes of
section 355 only if a binding commitment to make the second distribution
exists at the time that the first distribution is made.30 The Court of Claims,
in American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States,3' refused to apply
the step-transaction doctrine to treat a series of stock acquisitions followed
by a complete liquidation of the target company as a "C" reorganization
described in section 368(a)(1)(C). 32 In McDonald's v. Commissioner33 the
Tax Court held that the mutual interdependence test applied for purposes
of determining whether post-reorganization sales of acquiring company
stock must be taken into account in determining whether the continuity of
proprietary interest test is satisfied.34
The Gordon court addressed the issue of whether section 355(a)(1)(D)
permits a spin-off to occur in more than one distribution. Section
355(a)(l)(D) requires the distributing corporation to distribute, at a bare
minimum, stock constituting "control" of the distributed corporation. 35
Congress apparently enacted this very precise requirement to prevent a
parent corporation from making periodic distributions of small amounts of
a subsidiary's stock in lieu of ordinary dividends. 36 As such, the Court was
probably correct in holding that only the strictest formulation of the step-
transaction doctrine can tie two or more distributions together for purposes
of section 355(a)(1)(D); any other holding would tend to undermine the
intent of Congress. 37
In American Potash P initially acquired, solely in exchange for P voting
stock, 48% of the stock of T in September and November of 1954. More
than one year after P's initial tender offer expired, P acquired, again solely
in exchange for P voting stock, the remaining 52% of T. P then completely
liquidated T. The first tender offer priced the T stock at $60 per share, and
29. 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
30. Id. at 96.
31. 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl.), mod#fied 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
32. 399 F.2d at 201-05.
33. 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd sub nom. McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
34. 76 T.C. at 998.
35. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(D) (1982). The distributing corporation must either distribute all
of its stock in the distributed corporation or at least "control" of the distributed corporation,
as defined in § 368(c). If any stock in the distributed corporation is retained, the distributing
corporation must establish that the retention is not pursuant to a plan of tax avoidance. Id
36. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS &
SHAREHOLDERS 13.07, at 13-43, -44 (4th ed. 1979).
37. Section 355 is in essence "elective" in the same sense as § 332, because the precise
requirements must be satisfied in order for § 355 to apply to a distribution. For cases dis-
cussing the electivity of § 332, see supra note 21.
1985] 1059
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
the second priced the stock at $90 per share. After concluding that a series
of stock acquisitions involving two separate offers could not qualify as a
"B" reorganization described in section 368(a)(1)(B), 38 the court refused to
hold that a disqualified B reorganization could qualify as a C reorganiza-
tion by virtue of a subsequent complete liquidation of T.39 In a second
opinion the court remanded the question of whether the transaction consti-
tuted a B reorganization. 40 The facts of American Potash indicate that,
absent the planned complete liquidation of T, the second acquisition of
52% of the stock of T probably qualified as a B reorganization. At the time
that P acquired the first 48% of the stock of T, however, P was clearly not
assured of acquiring the control of T that section 368(a)(1)(B) requires.
The initial acquisition of 48% of the T stock probably was, therefore, a
taxable transaction to the exchanging T shareholders, because at least a
significant possibility remained that P would not have acquired control of
T immediately after the transaction.41 Given the reasonable conclusion
that P's initial acquisition of 48% of the stock of T should not qualify for
nonrecognition treatment under section 368(a)(1)(B), P reasonably could
be treated as owning 48% of the T stock on an "old and cold" basis at the
time that T was completely liquidated. By applying the end result test to
treat the subsequent acquisition of 52% of the stock of T, followed by the
complete liquidation of T, as an asset acquisition, the acquisition should
not have qualified as a C reorganization because 48% of the consideration
transferred by P in exchange for T assets, the stock of T, was "boot prop-
erty" in violation of the boot relaxation rule of section 368(a)(2)(B). 42
In McDonald's T merged into P under state law, pursuant to which the
shareholders of T received only common stock of P in exchange for their T
stock. Pursuant to registration rights granted to the T shareholders before
the merger, however, the former T shareholders sold substantially all of
their P stock in a secondary public offering shortly after the merger oc-
curred. The Tax Court held that, for purposes of determining whether the
continuity of proprietary interest test was satisfied by the merger, the
merger and the post-merger sale of P stock should be treated as a single
transaction only if the mutual interdependence test is satisfied.43 The Tax
38. 399 F.2d at 200.
39. 1d. at 201.
40. 402 F.2d at 1002.
41. Section 368(a)(l)(B) mandates that P be in control of T "immediately after" the
exchange. This "control immediately after" requirement is identical to the "control immedi-
ately after" requirement of § 351(a), to which the courts have applied the mutual interde-
pendence formulation of the step-transaction doctrine. See American Bantam Car Co. v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), aff'dper curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). In American Potash P took over 12 months to acquire control of
T. Given the substantial possibility that P would not acquire control of T at the time that P
acquired the initial 48% of T in 1954, the mutual interdependence formulation of the step-
transaction doctrine probably was not satisfied. Accordingly, the initial acquisition of 48%
of T probably should have been treated as a taxable acquisition.
42. Cf. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1959)
(P's surrendering of its T stock deemed additional consideration), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835
(1959).




The crux of the continuity-of-interest test lies in the continuation of
the acquired shareholders' proprietary interest. . . . In other words,
having entered the merger as shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tion, they must exit as shareholders in the acquiring corporation.
However, once they have acquired a sufficient proprietary interest in
the ongoing enterprise, the acquired shareholders should subse-
quently be free to do what they may with that interest without affect-
ing the reorganization status of the transaction. Just as they were free
to dispose of their shares in the premerger enterprise, so should they
be free to dispose of those shares in the postmerger enterprise ...
With this in mind, we believe that the "mutual interdependence
test" . . . is best suited to provide a frame of reference against which
to measure the "stepability" of the present transactions."
The Tax Court apparently advocates a stricter formulation of the step-
transaction doctrine than the end result test in evaluating continuity of
interest. This view is based on the absence of a requirement that the for-
mer T shareholders continue to hold their P stock for any period of time
after the reorganization, because the crux of the continuity-of-interest doc-
trine is simply that the T shareholders receive P stock in exchange for their
T stock.
To summarize, Gordon is distinguishable from the authorities applying
the end result test to creeping asset reorganizations on the ground that
Gordon involved a tax avoidance provision of section 355 that permits no
variance. American Potash can be harmonized with the authorities apply-
ing the end result test to creeping asset reorganizations on the ground that
the Court of Claims, in effect, applied the end result test to treat the subse-
quent acquisition of 52% of the stock of T, followed by the complete liqui-
dation of T, as an asset acquisition that could not qualify as a C
reorganization. Finally, the Tax Court's decision in McDonald's is distin-
guishable because it addressed an issue (namely, post-merger continuity of
interest) that justifies a stricter test than the definitional issues addressed by
King Enterprises and its kin. Accordingly, for purposes of determining
whether a creeping asset reorganization must be tested as an asset or stock
acquisition under the reorganization provisions, all courts considering the
issue have apparently applied the end result test.
II. OVERLAP OF THE LIQUIDATION AND REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS
The differing step-transaction tests applicable in the complete liquida-
tion and reorganization contexts do not, per se, create problems. For ex-
ample, if P acquires all of the stock of T solely in exchange for P voting
Heintz v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 132 (1955), wherein the Tax Court appears to have applied
the end result test under strikingly similar facts. Perhaps for this reason the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in reversing the Tax Court's decision in McDonald's, refrained from
adopting the Tax Court's position that the mutual interdependence test applies for con-
tinuity of interest purposes.
44. 76 T.C. at 997-98.
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stock, after which T is merged upstream into P, no difficulty results from
the treatment of the two transactions as both an A reorganization and as a
complete liquidation described in sections 332 and 334(b)(1). Under either
characterization, P acquires a carryover basis in T's assets and the T share-
holders recognize no gain or loss. In those cases with substantially the
same results under both the reorganization and complete liquidation pro-
visions, regardless of whether the steps are collapsed or treated as in-
dependent transactions, clearly no harm results to either the government
or the taxpayer from the application of differing step-transaction tests.
Problems may arise, however, in those cases in which one or more tax
consequences under the complete liquidation provisions conflict with one
or more tax consequences under the reorganization provisions. A determi-
nation may then be necessary as to whether one set of provisions preempts
the other, or, if both sets apply, which of the conflicting tax consequences
prevails. For example, suppose P acquires all of the stock of T, an unre-
lated corporation, in exchange for 90% P common stock and 10% cash.
The acquisition of 10% of the T stock for cash disqualifies the transaction
as a B reorganization. 45 Assume, however, that as in Kimbell-Diamondand
King Enterprises P intends to acquire the assets of T at the time that P
acquires the T stock, and, shortly after the stock acquisition, T is merged
upstream into P under state law. P also files a timely election under sec-
tion 338(g) to treat T as having purchased and sold its assets pursuant to
section 338(a). These facts set the stage for a discussion of what at one
time appeared to be the most difficult liquidation/reorganization overlap
problem in the post-TEFRA tax universe: which set of rules governs the
basis of T's assets in the hands of P and the tax consequences to the selling
T stockholders in a creeping asset acquisition.
Absent the section 338(g) election, the government could hardly object
to the treatment of the stock purchase/upstream merger as a good A reor-
ganization under the end result test of King Enterprises. Whether deter-
mined under section 334(b) or section 362(b), the tax basis of the T assets
in the hands of P will be the same as the tax basis of the T assets in the
hands of T prior to the upstream merger. 6 Unlike the situation in King
Enterprises,47 symmetry prevails: the T stockholders recognize gain only to
the extent of the cash received under section 356(a), and the gain inherent
in the T assets is preserved.
45. See Rev. Rul. 75-123, 1975-1 C.B. 115; see also Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d
1227, 1246 (3d Cir. 1980) (previous cash purchase of T stock disqualifies transaction as B
reorganization); Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980) (acquisition of 8%
of T stock for cash prior to exchange for 80% of T stock disqualifies transaction as B
reorganization).
46. See I.R.C. §§ 334(b)(1), 362(b) (1982).
47. In King Enterprises, 418 F.2d at 511, P obtained a ruling from the Internal Revenue
Service to the effect that the basis of the assets P received from T in the upstream merger was
stepped up under old § 334(b)(2) to reflect P's "cost basis" in the T stock. The cost basis
consisted of the cash and fair market value of P stock paid for the T stock. Thus, King
Enterprises represents a classic "whipsaw" in which the government failed to collect tax at
both the corporate and shareholder levels.
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If P were entitled to make a valid section 338(g) election, 48 however,
then the treatment of the stock acquisition/upstream merger as a good A
reorganization would "whipsaw" the government. Pursuant to sections
338(a) and 338(b), P would acquire a fair market value basis in T's as-
sets, 4 9 while T would obtain the benefit of nonrecognition under section
337 on the deemed sale of its assets to "new T."50 The T stockholders
would avoid gain recognition under section 354(a) to the extent that they
receive P stock in exchange for their T stock. 5' By virtue of the differing
step-transaction tests applied in the contexts of the liquidation and reor-
ganization provisions, a creeping asset acquisition arguably could have
been structured to permit the taxpayers to achieve the best of two worlds:
corporate-level basis step-up without gain recognition, and shareholder-
level gain deferral, or perhaps avoidance if the P stock were held until
death.
No Code provision states that, in the case of a transaction described in
both the reorganization and liquidation provisions, one set of rules governs
to the exclusion of the other. The courts do not agree as to whether one set
of rules preempts the other. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals finds no
incompatibility between the liquidation rules and the reorganization rules
and applies both sets of rules to the same transaction.5 2 The Court of
Claims evidently is of the opinion that the reorganization provisions com-
pletely preempt the liquidation provisions.53 The regulations under sec-
tion 332 assume that both sets of rules may apply to the same transaction,
but indicate that the liquidation provisions govern to the extent that they
mandate tax consequences different from those mandated by the reorgani-
zation provisions.54
A long line of "liquidation/reincorporation" cases support the argument
48. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
494, an argument could be made that P's acquisition of the T stock in the hypothetical
qualified as a purchase within the meaning of § 338(h)(3)(A). Because the end result test is
not applied for purposes of § 338, P arguably had made a qualified stock purchase within
the meaning of section 338(d)(3), provided no T stockholder owned either before or after the
transaction more than 50% in value of the stock of P and the cash was not taxed under
§ 304(a)(1). Thus, a § 338(g) election arguably would have been valid under the facts de-
scribed above. Fortunately, as discussed in the succeeding text, the Tax Reform Act of 1984
has amended the definition of "purchase" to exclude any transaction in which the transfer-
ring T shareholders are entitled to nonrecognition of gain or loss under § 354. As such, P
clearly will not be entitled to step up the basis of T's assets under the hypothetical. See infra
notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
49. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(k), 98 Stat. 494, 948 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 338).
50. I.R.C. § 338(a)(1) (1982).
51. Id. § 354(a).
52. General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).
53. See, e.g., FEC Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 548 F.2d 924, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(reorganization occurring during liquidation controls tax consequences); see also Abegg v.
Commissioner, 429 F.2d 1209, 1214 (2d Cir. 1970) (reorganization-liquidation in personal
holding company area), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971); American Mfg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C. 204, 224 (1970) (continued business operations indicative of reorganization).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(d) (1955). The view of the regulation appears consistent with
the General Housewares view of the overlap issue.
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that the reorganization provisions preempt the complete liquidation provi-
sions. In the typical "liquidation/reincorporation" case, sound tax policy
mandates that either the reorganization provisions preempt the liquidation
provisions or the transaction fails to qualify as a complete liquidation. 5
Such a case involves a purported liquidation of T either followed or pre-
ceded by a cash sale of the T assets to a corporation controlled by the
shareholders of T. If such a transaction were allowed to qualify as a com-
plete liquidation of T, followed or preceded by a sale of T's assets to P,
then the T shareholders would succeed in (1) withdrawing cash from a
controlled corporation, which will continue operations as a corporation af-
ter the withdrawal, at long-term capital gain rates, and (2) stepping up the
basis of T's assets, at little or no tax cost to T, without losing control over
those assets. Clearly, section 301 (c)(1) would be repealed if such treatment
were allowed.56 Complete liquidation treatment should not be available,
therefore, if P is controlled by the T shareholders.
If the purchasing corporation is not controlled by the shareholders of T,
however, generally no reason mandates not affording T and its sharehold-
ers complete liquidation or sale treatment. Relinquishing control over an
asset is an intrinsic characteristic of a sale. In essence, the T shareholders
are not withdrawing cash from a controlled and continuing corporation at
long-term capital gain rates, or stepping up the basis of T's assets to fair
market value without relinquishing control over those assets. Permitting
these kinds of transactions to qualify as complete liquidations or sales
poses no threat of repeal of section 301(c)(1). 57 Thus, if P is not controlled
by the shareholders of T, complete liquidation treatment, from a policy
standpoint, generally should be available.
Returning to the hypothetical, section 338 is arguably inconsistent with
the reorganization provisions, which require P to take a carryover basis in
55. In Telephone Answering Serv. Co. v. Commissioner (TASCO), 63 T.C. 423 (1974),
afdper curiam, 39 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-786 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914(1977), the Tax Court considered an alleged complete liquidation in which T's operating
assets ended up in a new corporation controlled by T's stockholders. Judge Tannenwald
held that the term "complete liquidation" requires a distribution of all of the assets of T; that
the new corporation holding T's operating assets, owned by substantially the same share-
holders as T, was a "mere continuation" of T; and accordingly, no complete liquidation
occurred because T did not distribute all of its assets. 63 T.C. at 435. Thus, the TASCO case
presented no question of whether the reorganization provisions preempt the liquidation pro-
visions. The typical liquidation/reincorporation case, however, involves a finding of reor-
ganization in lieu of complete liquidation, with the implicit understanding that the
reorganization provisions preempt the complete liquidation provisions. Cf Reef Corp. v.
Commissioner, 66-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9716, at 87,326 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding clear reorgan-
ization); American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204, 221 (1970) (liquidating steps
merely integral parts of reorganization).
56. In addition, for the cost of obtaining a new corporate charter, T could step up the
basis of its assets to current fair market value. This aspect of the "liquida-
tion/reincorporation" transaction seems as repugnant as the repeal of § 301(c)(1).
57. Section 304, which applies to a stock sale only if the selling T shareholders actually
or constructively own 50% or more in vote or value of the stock of P before or after the
transaction, confirms this proposition. I.R.C. § 304(c)(1) (1982). If a stock transfer in which
the T shareholders own less than 50% of P qualifies for sale treatment, then an asset transfer
in which the T shareholders own less than 50% of P should qualify for sale treatment.
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the assets of T58 and, therefore, should not apply if the transaction also
constitutes a good A reorganization. Some merit for this analysis possibly
prevailed in the pre-TEFRA tax world as old section 334(b)(2) allowed the
step-up in basis of T's assets only if P acquired T's assets in liquidation.
Because the basis-determining event under both section 362(b) and old
section 334(b)(2) was P's acquisition of T's assets, clearly section 362(b)
and old section 334(b)(2) conflicted with each other.59
In the post-TEFRA tax world, however, the basis-determining event
under section 338 is P's acquisition of T's stock. Of course, for purposes of
determining the application of the reorganization provisions to the hypo-
thetical, the transaction is treated as an asset acquisition. The basis-deter-
mining event, therefore, is P's acquisition of T's assets. Section 334(b) in
the post-TEFRA Code, along with section 362(b), requires P to take a car-
ryover basis in the assets of T upon the complete liquidation of T.60 Thus,
after TEFRA, the complete liquidation provisions governing the basis of
T's assets generally will not directly conflict with the reorganization provi-
sions governing the basis of T's assets.
The strongest argument against applying section 338 to the hypothetical
is that allowing P to step up the basis in T's assets is inconsistent with the
nonrecognition treatment afforded T's shareholders under the reorganiza-
tion provisions6' and may result in a permanent avoidance of taxation of
the gain inherent in T. First, because section 338(a)(1) provides that sec-
tion 337 applies to the "deemed sale" of T's assets to "new T,'" 62 no corpo-
rate level tax, other than tax on recapture, is triggered by the step-up.6 3
Second, if the former T shareholders retain their P stock until death, their
heirs will obtain a basis step-up to fair market value pursuant to section
1014(a). 64 As the Code would not allow such tax avoidance if T had di-
rectly merged into P in exchange for 90% P stock and 10% cash, clearly
such tax avoidance should not be allowed to exist in the case of the creep-
ing merger described in the hypothetical. Accordingly, under the prior
Code, which permitted a creeping asset acquisition to qualify as a stock
purchase described in section 338, a court might have held, applying "sub-
stance over form" principles, either that P is not permitted an election
under section 338(g) or that the transaction does not qualify as a good A
reorganization.
Fortunately, the enactment of section 712(k)(5) of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 (the "Act") 65 relieves courts of the obligation of confronting the
58. See I.R.C. § 362(b) (1982).
59. In a dictum the Tax Court had indicated that perhaps the reorganization provisions
and old § 334(b)(2) might apply to the same transaction. Kass v. Commissioner (May B.
Kass), 60 T.C. 218, 222 (1973), af'd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974).
60. See I.R.C. §§ 334(b), 362(b) (1982).
61. See id §§ 354, 356. Section 354 provides general nonrecognition treatment, while
§ 356 requires gain to be recognized to the extent boot is received.
62. Id § 338(a)(1).
63. Id.
64. See id § 1014(a).
65. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
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issue. Paragraph (D) of section 712(k)(5) of the Act amended the defini-
tion of "purchase" set forth in section 338(h)(3)(A) to provide that a trans-
action does not qualify as a purchase if the target stock is acquired in an
exchange to which section 351, 354, 355, or 356 applies or if the transferor
of the target stock otherwise does not recognize the entire amount of the
gain or loss realized in the transaction.66 Since section 338(a) may apply
only if at least 80% of the T stock is acquired by purchase, this amendment
removes the creeping asset acquisition described in the hypothetical from
the jurisdiction of section 338.67 If under the end result test of King Enter-
prises, the shareholders of T are entitled to nonrecognition treatment under
section 354,68 then P has not acquired 80% of the T stock by "purchase," as
defined in section 338(h)(3)(A) after the amendment.69 Thus, P will not be
allowed to step up the basis of T's assets under section 338(g).70
With enactment of the Act, Congress resolved one of the principal
problems inherent in the dual application of the liquidation and reorgani-
zation provisions to creeping asset acquisitions: the inconsistency of asset
basis step-up at the corporate level and nonrecognition of gain at the
shareholder level. The treatment of a creeping asset acquisition as a reor-
ganization will now remove the stock acquisition from the jurisdiction of
section 338. P may no longer accomplish via a creeping acquisition a re-
sult that could not be accomplished via a direct merger of T into P.
To summarize, from a technical standpoint the better conclusion with
respect to a creeping asset acquisition in which P and T are unrelated is
that the complete liquidation and reorganization provisions have concur-
rent jurisdiction over the transactions71 and that the complete liquidation
provisions govern the tax consequences to P and T.72 From a tax policy
66. Id § 712(k)(5)(D), 98 Stat. 494, 950 (codified at I.R.C. § 338(h)(3)(A)).
67. See I.R.C. § 338(a) (1982).
68. T shareholders recognize no gain in a reorganization to the extent target stock is
exchanged for stock of the acquiring corporation. Id § 354(a)(1).
69. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(k)(5)(D), 98 Stat. 494, 950
(to be codified at I.R.C. § 338(h)(3)(A)).
70. The election to step up the basis of the assets received from T must be made by a
"purchasing corporation." I.R.C. § 338(g)(2) (1982). P's failure to make a qualified stock
"purchase," pursuant to § 338(a), removes P from the statutory definition of purchasing cor-
poration. Id. § 338(d)(1).
71. See Rogan v. Starr Piano Co., 139 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728
(1943); see also Bruce, Liquidations and Reorganizations.- Madison Square Gardens and
Kass, 30 TAX L. REV. 303, 351 (1973). In other areas the courts and the government have
ruled that other provisions of the Code may also apply to transactions described in the
reorganization provisions. For decisions holding that the principles of §§ 351 and 368 have
concurrent application, see Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527, 533 (1942);
Leckie v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 252, 257 (1938); Handbird Holding Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 32 B.T.A. 238, 247 (1935), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 1936); Royal Marcher v. Com-
missioner, 32 B.T.A. 76, 79-80 (1935), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 1936); Rev. Rul. 84-71,
1984-19 I.R.B. 6; Rev. Rul. 79-274, 1979-2 C.B. 131; Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99; Rev.
Rul. 76-123, 1976-1 C.B. 94. Other decisions state that the concepts of §§ 332 and 368 have
concurrent jurisdiction. See Performance Sys., Inc. v. United States, 73-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9743, at 82,426 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), afl'dper curiam, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1974); Movielab,
Inc. v. United States, 494 F.2d 693, 701 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Eastern Color Printing Co. v. Com-
missioner, 63 T.C. 27, 35 (1974).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(d) (1955). Cases such as Performing Sys., Inc. v. United
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standpoint, given the Act's elimination of the possibility of making a sec-
tion 338 election in a King Enterprises "creeping merger," this result is
sound in all cases in which P is not controlled by the shareholders who
control T.
III. CONTINUITY OF INTEREST
The following hypothetical illustrates the principal difficulty in applying
the continuity of proprietary interest test to creeping asset reorganizations:
P owns 89% of the outstanding stock of T; the remaining 11% is owned by
Mr. A, an individual who owns no stock of P. P acquired its 89% interest
in the stock of T fifteen years ago. T merges upstream into P under state
law, with P surviving. Pursuant to the merger, Mr. A exchanges all of his
T stock solely for P voting stock. P's initial acquisition of 89% of T fifteen
years ago is "old and cold" and clearly not part of a single transaction that
includes the present upstream merger of T into P.
The courts initially developed the continuity of proprietary interest test
to distinguish reorganizations from sales. 73 The theory underlying the test
is that Congress designed the reorganization provisions to defer tax on
transactions involving "only a change in the corporate form in which busi-
ness was conducted without an actual realization of any gain from an ex-
change of properties. '74 In order to constitute a "mere change in form" of
conducting the business, a substantial portion of the consideration received
by the T shareholders must be P stock. 75 Thus, the continuity of proprie-
tary interest doctrine mandates that, in order to qualify as a corporate re-
organization, a significant percentage of the total consideration issued in
exchange for the acquired company's stock or assets must be stock of the
acquiring company.
The courts have never delineated a clear minimum ratio of stock to total
consideration. The Supreme Court, however, has approved a merger in
which approximately 38% of the consideration consisted of stock,76 and the
Tax Court has disqualified transactions in which 16% of the consideration
was acquiring company stock.77 As a general rule, therefore, a merger of
T into P, pursuant to which only 11% of the consideration is P stock, fails
to satisfy the continuity of proprietary interest test. The hypothetical given
States, 73-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9743, at 82,426 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'dper curiam, 501 F.2d
1338 (6th Cir. 1974), afforded P and T reorganization treatment when such treatment was
more favorable to the taxpayer than liquidation treatment.
73. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 418 (1940); Cortland Speciality Co. v. Com-
missioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1932).
74. Cortland Speciality Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932).
75. See Kass v. Commissioner (May B. Kass), 60 T.C. 218, 222 (1973), aff'a 491 F.2d
749 (3d Cir. 1974) (percentage of consideration comprised of P stock (16%) was not substan-
tial enough to satisfy the test).
76. See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935); see also Miller v.
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415, 418 (6th Cir. 1936) (indicating 25% continuity sufficient).
77. See Kass v. Commissioner (May B. Kass), 60 T.C. 218, 227 (1973), aft'd, 491 F.2d
749 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168, 177 (15%
insufficient).
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above poses the issue of whether 11% of the consideration may be P stock
when the balance of the consideration is T stock owned on an "old and
cold" basis by p.78
In Frelmont Realty Corp. v. Commissionep 9 an 80% subsidiary merged
upstream into its parent under state law. The parent argued for reorgani-
zation treatment. The Board of Tax Appeals disagreed, however, holding
that the transaction was in substance a liquidation.80 A later decision,
Warner Co. v. Commissioner,8' involved a parent corporation's acquisition
of 100% control of a previously 33% owned subsidiary. As part of an inte-
grated plan, the parent subsequently liquidated the subsidiary. The gov-
ernment argued that the transaction amounted to a reorganization, giving
P a carryover basis in the subsidiary's assets. Once again, however, the
Board of Tax Appeals disagreed, holding that the transaction was a liqui-
dation.8 2 The Warner Co. case is important because it was based on the
theory that the continuity of proprietary interest test was not satisfied. The
court reasoned, "it can hardly be said that the stockholders of the dissolved
[subsidiary] became the stockholders of the taxpayer, as the taxpayer itself
was the sole stockholder of [the subsidiary]."8 3 These two early decisions
indicate that the Tax Court at one time viewed an upstream merger as
incapable of qualifying as a reorganization.
In Warner, however, no P stock was issued to the minority shareholders.
By contrast, General Counsel's Memorandum 747284 involved P's acquisi-
tion of all of the assets of T, a 60% owned subsidiary of P, in exchange for
P stock, after which T was completely liquidated. Thus, the minority
shareholders of T received only P stock in exchange for their T stock. The
government conceded that the transaction qualified as a reorganization
and permitted the minority shareholders of T nonrecognition treatment.
In a subsequent decision, the Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the
government.8 5
Finally, in 1943 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals espoused a proposi-
78. In reality P acquires the assets of T in exchange for: (1) P stock issued to Mr. A; (2)
89% of the T stock that P is, in effect, giving back to T in exchange for T's assets; and (3) the
assumption of T's liabilities. Unless T is so thinly capitalized, or insolvent, that its creditors
are deemed to be its stockholders, however, the assumption of T's liabilities generally is not
treated as consideration for purposes of the continuity of proprietary interest test. Cf.
Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183 (1941) (continuity of
interest test satisfied when bankruptcy creditors stepped into shoes of old stockholders).
79. 29 B.T.A. 181 (1933).
80. Id at 189.
81. 26 B.T.A. 1225 (1932).
82. Id at 1228.
83. Id at 1227.
84. G.C.M. 7472, IX-1 C.B. 184 (1930), declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-44, 1969-1
C.B. 312.
85. See Winston Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 905, 909 (1934), affd, 76 F.2d
381 (8th Cir. 1935); see also Gutbro Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.
1943) (nonrecognition treatment accorded in absence of complete liquidation). But see Ro-
gan v. Starr Piano Co., 139 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.) (nonrecognition treatment denied in
absence of stock-for-stock exchange), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1943).
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tion that is reasonable and probably represents the law today.86 The court
rejected the argument that a transaction cannot be both a liquidation and a
reorganization, holding that it can in fact be both.87 In addition, the court
held that qualifying as a reorganization does not automatically afford P
nonrecognition treatment on the receipt of T's assets.88 Finding no provi-
sion in the reorganization context that provided P with nonrecognition
treatment on the receipt of T assets in exchange for T stock, the court held
that P recognized gain on the transaction.8 9
The pre-1954 Code case law and rulings failed to define clearly the role
played by P's "old and cold" T stock for purposes of the continuity of
proprietary interest test. However, the better view concluded that the as-
sets received by P in respect of "old and cold" T stock were deemed re-
ceived in exchange for qualifying consideration for purposes of the
continuity of proprietary interest test. This view was based on the ground
that such assets remain in corporate solution and continue to be owned by
the same interests, the P shareholders, that owned them prior to the
transaction.
The modem cases and rulings uniformly indicate that P's "old and cold"
T stock, in one manner or another, counts for purposes of the continuity of
proprietary interest test. In May B. Kass90 the Tax Court stated that: re-
organization treatment is appropriate when the parent's stock ownership in
the subsidiary was not acquired as a step in a plan to acquire assets of the
subsidiary. The parent's stockholdings can be counted as contributing to
continuity-of-interest, so that since such holding represented more than 80
percent of the stock of the subsidiary, the continuity-of-interest test would
be met.9 ' Although a dictum in the Kass case because P's T stock clearly
was not "old and cold," the foregoing reasoning remains undeniably
strong.
In Revenue Ruling 58-9392 the government considered a case in which P
owned, on an "old and cold" basis, 79% of the stock of T, with the balance
being owned by minority shareholders. After transferring all of its assets
to a new subsidiary, T merged upstream into P. Pursuant to the merger,
the minority shareholders of T received P stock in exchange for their T
stock. The government ruled that the upstream merger qualified as a good
A reorganization. 93 Unless the government found the 21% continuity suffi-
cient to satisfy the continuity of proprietary interest test, a highly unlikely
interpretation of the ruling, the ruling indicates that the government ac-
counted for the "old and cold" T stock owned by P in applying the test.
86. Rogan v. Starr Piano Co., 139 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1943).
87. 139 F.2d at 674.
88. Id at 673.
89. Id
90. Kass v. Commissioner (May B. Kass), 60 T.C. 218 (1973), af', 491 F.2d 749 (3d
Cir. 1974).
91. 60 T.C. at 223.
92. Rev. Rul. 58-93, 1958-1 C.B. 188.
93. Id at 189.
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Thus, under the view of both the Tax Court and the government, the
hypothetical described above apparently qualifies as a good A reorganiza-
tion. The views of the government and the Tax Court seem to diverge,
however, as to how P's "old and cold" T stock is taken into account. The
Kass dictum above indicates that P should be deemed to have received the
T assets, distributed in respect of P's "old and cold" T stock, in exchange
for qualifying consideration consisting of P stock. If Mr. A received con-
sideration consisting of $10 worth of P stock and $90 cash for his 11%
interest in T, the transaction would nonetheless qualify as a good A reor-
ganization under the Tax Court's view. By contrast, the government's
view apparently excludes P's "old and cold" T stock from both the numer-
ator and denominator of the continuity of proprietary interest test; the test
is limited to the consideration paid to Mr. A in exchange for his T stock.94
Thus, if 16% or less of the consideration issued to Mr. A in the merger is in
P stock, the transaction clearly fails to qualify as a good A reorganization
under the government's view.
The better view, assuming the continuity of proprietary interest test has
merit, seems to be that of the government. Under the hypothetical de-
scribed above, P already owns 89% of the capital and profits interest in T's
assets and, in substance, is acquiring Mr. A's additional 11% interest in T's
assets. Thus, examining only the mix of consideration being paid to Mr. A
for his T stock for purposes of applying the continuity of proprietary inter-
est test seems appropriate.
In any event, applying either the Tax Court's view, taking P's "old and
cold" T stock into account by including it in both the numerator and de-
nominator of the continuity test, or the government's view, taking P's "old
and cold" T stock into account by excluding it from both the numerator
and denominator of the continuity test, the hypothetical described above
clearly satisfies the test because the only consideration received by Mr. A is
P stock. On the other hand, if P's ownership of the T stock had not been
"old and cold," then the test would examine not only the consideration
given to Mr. A, but also the consideration paid by P for its 89% interest.95
If, counting the P stock issued in the merger to Mr. A as well as any P
stock issued in the transaction in which P acquired its 89% interest in T,
sufficient P stock has been issued to satisfy the continuity of proprietary
interest test, then the transaction should qualify as a good A reorganiza-
94. See Krane, Current Problems in Acquisitive Reorganizations, 51 TAXES 737, 749-50
(1973); Levin & Bowen, supra note 20, at 448; McGaffey & Hunt, Continuity of Shareholder
Interest in Acquisitive Corporate Reorganizations, 59 TAXES 659, 670-72 (1981); Private Letter
Ruling 8237016 (June 11, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 7905053 (Oct. 31, 1978). In Private
Letter Ruling 8311103 (Dec. 16, 1982), however, the Service stated that P's "old and cold"
ownership of T stock will be included in the continuity of interest fraction (presumably in
both the numerator and the denominator). The Service, therefore, may be moving away
from the position that "old and cold" T stock is excluded from both the numerator and
denominator of the continuity of interest fraction.
95. See Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 83-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) $ 9320, at 86,824
(5th Cir. 1983); Superior Coach of Florida, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 895, 905-06
(1983); Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168, 177 (1973); Kass v. Commissioner
(May B. Kass), 60 T.C. 218, 223 (1973), affd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974).
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tion. Each T shareholder receiving P stock, including both Mr. A and
those participating in the first transaction, should be entitled to nonrecog-
nition treatment to the extent of the P stock received. 96
IV. THE BAUSCH & LOMB "DOCTRINE"
Besides potential continuity of interest problems, P's ownership of "old
and cold" T stock raises additional questions. These issues include
whether such T stock will be treated as boot in the reorganization and
whether P will recognize gain or loss on the receipt of T assets in exchange
for such T stock. Consideration of the following three examples facilitates
an understanding of these issues.
ExampleA. T owns assets worth $100 and has no liabilities. P acquires
all of T's assets solely in exchange for $80 worth of P stock and real estate
worth $20. The real estate has an adjusted basis in P's hands of $10. T
completely liquidates, distributing the P stock and land to its shareholders.
Example A clearly constitutes a good C reorganization. As required by
the "boot relaxation rule" of section 368(a)(2)(B), 97 P acquired 80% in
value of the assets of T solely in exchange for P voting stock. P, however,
also transferred $20 worth of appreciated real estate in exchange for $20
worth of T's assets. Unless section 1031 covers this exchange, clearly P will
recognize $10 of gain on the exchange, because no rule in the reorganiza-
tion provisions prevents the acquiring corporation from recognizing gain
on an exchange of appreciated boot property for assets in an otherwise
qualifying reorganization. 98 If the real estate were worth $25 and the P
stock worth $75, then, the transaction would also fail to qualify as a good
C reorganization due to the failure to satisfy the boot relaxation rule.99
Example B. In lieu of owning real estate, P owns 20% of the stock of T,
which is worth $20 and has an adjusted basis of $10 in P's hands. P ac-
quires all of T's assets in exchange for $80 worth of P stock and P's T
stock. T then completely liquidates, distributing the P stock to the outside
shareholders of T. As P is not a T shareholder at the time of liquidation, P
receives none of this distribution.
Like the real estate transferred by P in Example A, the T stock owned by
P and transferred to T in exchange for T assets in Example B constitutes
boot for purposes of the reorganization provisions.I°° Although the trans-
action satisfies the boot relaxation rule and thus qualifies as a good C reor-
96. See King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 520-21 (Ct. C1. 1969).
97. The transaction qualifies as a C reorganization as the P stock received by T equalled
80% of the value of the T assets acquired by P. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1982).
98. See Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197. Section 361(b)(1) prevents the acquired cor-
poration from recognizing gain on the receipt of boot property, provided the boot is distrib-
uted in the transaction. I.R.C. § 361(b)(1) (1982).
99. Id § 368(a)(2)(B); see supra note 97 and accompanying text. Section 1032 prevents
P from recognizing gain on the exchange of P stock for T assets notwithstanding the fact that
the transaction fails to qualify as a good C reorganization. I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1982).
100. See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959); Grede Foundries, Inc. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 263, 265
(E.D. Wis. 1962).
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ganization, it nonetheless results in $10 of gain recognition to P.'0
Example C. P owns 25% of the stock of T, which is worth $25 and has
an adjusted basis of $15. T transfers all of its assets to P solely in exchange
for $100 of P voting common stock. Subsequently, T completely liqui-
dates, distributing $25 worth of P stock to P and $75 worth of P stock to
the remaining T shareholders.
The only differences between Example B and Example C are: (1) P
owns 25% of the stock of T in Example C; and (2) P does not exchange its
T stock directly for assets of T; rather, P first acquires all of T's assets
solely for P stock and gets back 25% of the P stock in exchange for P's T
stock. In Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner'0 2 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, under similar facts, held that the "circular" flow of
P stock to T and back to P should be ignored and that P should be treated
as acquiring the assets of T in exchange for 25% T stock and 75% P
stock.'0 3 Under this characterization, P recognizes gain on the exchange of
its 25% interest in the T stock for T assets, and the boot relaxation rule is
violated.'°4 Thus, under the facts of Example C, the transaction is not a
good reorganization, and P recognizes $10 of gain.
At least five methods are available by which P, or a wholly owned P
subsidiary, may be combined with T under the facts of Example C such
that the transaction qualifies as a reorganization. The most obvious
method involves an upstream merger of T into P under state law. Revenue
Ruling 58-93 holds that such an upstream merger qualifies as an A reor-
ganization, provided that a substantial portion of the consideration paid to
the 75% T shareholders for their T stock is P stock.' 0 5 Of course, as noted
above, P would still recognize $10 of gain on the swap of its T stock for
25% of the T assets. A second method is to merge P downstream into T.
The weight of authority holds that such a transaction qualifies as an A
reorganization, provided that a substantial portion of the consideration
paid to the P shareholders for their P stock is T stock. 0 6
101. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982). For a different resolution, however, see Rev. Rul. 58-93,
1958-1 C.B. 188. Revenue Ruling 58-93 is contrary to the conclusion that P recognizes gain
or loss on a transfer of T stock in exchange for T assets pursuant to an otherwise good
reorganization. In that ruling the government held that P recognized no gain or loss on an
upstream merger of a 79%-owned subsidiary. Id. Revenue Ruling 58-93 appears irreconcil-
able with the result described in Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197, wherein accounts receiv-
able, rather than T stock, were used by P to acquire T assets. Thus, Revenue Ruling 72-327
apparently modifies Revenue Ruling 58-93 on the issue of gain recognition by P.
102. 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959).
103. 267 F.2d at 77.
104. For discussion of the "boot relaxation" rule, see supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
105. Rev. Rul. 58-93, 1958-1 C.B. 188.
106. See Commissioner v. Webster's Estate, 131 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1942); Commis-
sioner v. Gilmore's Estate, 130 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir. 1942); Helvering v. Einhorn, 100
F.2d 418, 418 (2d Cir. 1938); H. Grady Manning Trust v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 930, 941
(1950). Similarly, Rev. Rul. 78-47, 1978-1 C.B. 148, holds that a transfer of a holding com-
pany's assets to a 5%-owned subsidiary amounts to a good C reorganization, even though the
subsidiary's stock constituted 71% of the parent's assets. Assets other than subsidiary stock
satisfied the "substantially all" test of § 368(a)(1)(C).
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A third method of combination consists of P organizing a wholly owned
subsidiary for the purpose of acquiring the remaining T stock and then
merging the subsidiary into T, pursuant to which the outside T sharehold-
ers must either accept P voting, common stock or exercise their appraisal
rights. This transaction cannot qualify as a "reverse triangular merger"
pursuant to section 368(a)(2)(E) because P will not acquire "control," de-
fined as at least 80%, of T in the merger.10 7 Provided that T, not P, sup-
plies the cash to pay off any dissenters, 0 8 however, the reverse merger
should qualify as a good B reorganization.10 9
Revenue Ruling 57-278 110 describes the fourth, and perhaps most inter-
esting, technique. In that ruling P formed a new, wholly owned subsidi-
ary, S, by transferring to S $100 worth of P voting common stock. T
subsequently transferred all of its assets to S solely in exchange for P vot-
ing common stock. Thereafter, T completely liquidated, distributing 75%
of the P stock to T's outside shareholders and 25% of the P stock back to P.
The government ruled that the transaction constituted a good C reorgani-
zation, pursuant to which P, S, and T recognized no gain or loss.I1 ' In so
ruling the government distinguished Revenue Ruling 54-396,'12 which
stated the litigating position that ultimately prevailed in the Bausch &
Lomb case, on the ground that S did not acquire any T assets in exchange
for T stock." 3 In contrast, in Revenue Ruling 54-396 as in Bausch &
Lomb, clearly more than 20% of the assets of T was acquired in exchange
for T stock. Thus, the government views the problems described above as
avoided if P forms a new subsidiary to acquire the assets of T in exchange
for P stock"1 4
107. See Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 C.B. 124; Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 C.B. 125; Ferguson
& Ginsburg, Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAX L. REv. 159 (1973).
108. Compare Rev. Rul. 68-285, 1968-1 C.B. 147 (good B reorganization when cash to
pay dissenters comes from T, even though less than 80% of T stock acquired solely for P
voting stock), with Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110 (bad B reorganization when P, directly
or indirectly, provides the cash used to redeem T stock).
109. See Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 C.B. 125; Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 C.B. 124; Rev. Rul.
67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144.
110. Rev. Rul. 57-278, 1957-1 C.B. 124. If P's T stock is not "old and cold," the tech-
nique will not work. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-48, 1969-1 C.B. 106 (purchase as integral step in
acquisition not "old and cold," and acquisition disqualified).
111. Rev. Rul. 75-278, 1957-1 C.B. 124.
112. Rev. Rul. 54-396, 1954-2 C.B. 147.
113. Rev. Rul. 57-278, 1957-1 C.B. 124. Query whether S should be deemed to have
acquired 25% of T's assets in exchange for S stock.
114. An interesting question is whether a state law merger of T into S, pursuant to which
the 75% T shareholders receive only P stock in exchange for their T stock, would qualify as a
reorganization. Section 368(a)(2)(D) applies only if no S stock is issued in the merger. Ar-
suably, S stock is constructively issued to P in exchange for P's T stock because no P stock is
issued to P in the merger, whereas the fair market value of the S stock is increased by 25% of
the fair market value of T, which is P's interest in the T stock. Perhaps Rev. Rul. 67-326,
1967-2 C.B. 143, which holds that a triangular merger that does not qualify as an A reorgan-
ization may nonetheless qualify as a C reorganization, resolves the dilemma. The govern-
ment, therefore, may be charitable and rule that a triangular merger of T into S should be
deemed to be a qualifying C reorganization in which S acquires all the assets of T solely in




Of the foregoing four techniques for combining P, or a wholly owned P
subsidiary, with T under the facts of Example C, clearly the first alterna-
tive, the upstream merger of T into P, is inferior to the second, third, and
fourth alternatives. Alternative one is inferior for the simple reason that P
recognizes $10 of gain in the first alternative, but recognizes no gain or loss
in the other three alternatives. Thus, as in most contexts in Subchapter C,
form remains critical in many cases in which P owns stock of T prior to the
acquisition of T's assets.'1 5
A fifth technique for avoiding gain at the P level and combining the
assets of P and T without gain recognition to the 75% T shareholders mer-
its discussion. This technique is a variation on the reverse triangular
merger of S into T, pursuant to which the 75% T shareholders exchange
their T stock solely for voting, common stock of P. After completion of the
reverse merger, T becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of P. T subse-
quently merges upstream into P. The reverse merger of S into T and the
upstream merger of T into P will likely be treated as a single transaction
for purposes of the reorganization provisions." 16 As such, the transaction
constitutes a good A reorganization in which the 75% shareholders of T
recognize no gain or loss.117 As discussed above, however, the reverse
merger of S into T followed by the upstream merger of T into P should not
be combined for purposes of the post-TEFRA liquidation provisions."
8
Treasury Regulation section 1.332-2(d) clearly mandates that the tax con-
sequences to P of the upstream merger must be governed by sections 332
and 334(b), since P owns at least 80% of the T stock on the date of the
upstream merger.' 19 Accordingly, P recognizes no gain or loss on the up-
stream merger of T into P pursuant to section 332.120
115. The excellent work of the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee, entitled "The
Reform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations" (Sept. 22, 1983), ad-
dressed, and argued forcefully for eliminating, virtually all forms of "transactional selectiv-
ity" in the reorganization context. Even if all of the reforms suggested by the Staff were
enacted, the facts of Example C would still contain the transactional election of gain recog-
nition by P (e.g., if T is merged upstream into P), versus gain avoidance by P (e.g., if P is
merged downstream into T). Thus, in those cases in which P owns, on an "old and cold"
basis, less than 80% of the stock of T, competent tax advice will be required if P is to navi-
gate safely the hazardous waters of the so-called Bausch & Lomb doctrine.
116. Using the step-transaction doctrine, the transaction would likely be characterized as
an upstream merger into P, pursuant to which the 75% T shareholders receive P stock in
exchange for their T stock. See King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
117. If the two steps are not combined for purposes of the reorganization provisions,
however, the first step will qualify as a good B reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B)
(1982). The 75% T shareholders, therefore, have no downside.
118. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 192, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 781.
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(d) (1955).
120. Section 332(b)(1) provides that P must own 80% of T upon adoption of the plan of
liquidation and upon consummation of the complete liquidation. I.R.C. § 332(b)(1) (1982).
If P intends to merge T upstream at the time that P acquires 75% of T, the government might
contend that T "adopted" a "plan" of liquidation before P owned 80% of T and, therefore,
that § 332 cannot apply to the liquidation. Such contention is of doubtful merit even if P is a
majority shareholder of T when P forms the intention to acquire all of T. See Honigman v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1067, 1079 (1971); Alameda Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.
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The principal conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion is
that substantial dangers and planning opportunities exist in cases in which
P owns a substantial block, but less than 80%, of the stock of T prior to the
acquisition of T's assets. In those cases careful consideration must be paid
to the form of the transaction.
V. TRIANGULAR ASSET ACQUISITIONS
An issue that may emerge in creeping asset acquisition cases in which all
or a portion of T's assets are to be held by a subsidiary of P is whether the
acquisition constitutes a complete liquidation of T, within the meaning of
the liquidation provisions. The only definition of "complete liquidation"
found in the liquidation provisions is as follows:
A status of liquidation exists when the corporation ceases to be a go-
ing concern and its activities are merely for the purpose of winding up
its affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any remaining balance to
its shareholders. A liquidation may be completed prior to the actual
dissolution of the liquidating corporation. However, legal dissolution
of the corporation is not required. Nor will the mere retention of a
nominal amount of assets for the sole purpose of preserving the corpo-
ration's legal existence disqualify the transaction.' 2'
Generally, the foregoing definition presents no difficulty in application,
particularly if the corporation ceases to exist via dissolution or merger
under state law.' 22 The continued ownership of the corporation's assets by
a corporation owned, in whole or in part, by the shareholders of the liqui-
dated corporation, however, creates substantial difficulty.
A landmark case in the area is Judge Tannenwald's decision in Tele-
phone Answering Service Co. v. Commissioner (TASCO). 123 TASCO was
primarily a holding company; however, approximately 15% of the assets of
TASCO consisted of assets used by TASCO in conducting an answering
service. TASCO adopted a plan of complete liquidation and sold stock of
one of its two preexisting subsidiaries to an unrelated third party. TASCO
also transferred all of its answering service assets to a newly organized,
wholly owned corporation (New TASCO). TASCO then liquidated, dis-
tributing all of its assets to its shareholders in complete redemption of all
of the issued and outstanding TASCO stock. These assets consisted of the
stock of New TASCO, the stock of one of its preexisting subsidiaries, and
cash received on the sale of the other subsidiary. TASCO asserted that,
because the liquidating distribution occurred within twelve months after
TASCO adopted its plan of complete liquidation, section 337 applied to
273, 281 (1964); Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(b) (1955); Rev. Rul. 65-235, 1965-2 C.B. 88. If P is a
minority shareholder of T at the time that P formulates the intention to acquire all of P, the
contention is of no merit.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(c) (1955).
122. See id § 1.332-2(d); see also Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 67-326,
1967-2 C.B. 143 (both rulings holding that state law merger of T into P constitutes a "com-
plete liquidation" of T for purposes of liquidation provisions).
123. 63 T.C. 423 (1974), affdper curiam, 39 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-786 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
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prevent TASCO from recognizing gain on the sale of the preexisting sub-
sidiary.124 The majority of the Tax Court disagreed, holding that TASCO
had not been "completely liquidated."'' 25 According to Judge Tannen-
wald, the term "complete liquidation" requires:
A bona fide elimination of the corporate entity and does not include a
transaction in which substantially the same shareholders continue to
utilize a substantial part of the directly owned assets of the same enter-
prise in uninterrupted corporateform. . . .The transitory coexistence
of TASCO and New TASCO does not support the conclusion that the
subsequent but prearranged liquidation of the former effected a suffi-
cient transmutation of the assets of petitioner out of corporate solu-
tion to satisfy the requirement of section 337 of "all of the assets of the
corporation" be distributed. To hold for petitioner in the instant case
would frustrate the congressional purpose to deny section 337 treat-
ment in connection with distributions of ongoing corporations. We
cannot give tax effect to the "mere shifting of charters" .. masquer-
ading as a complete liquidation.' 26
Thus, in the view of a majority of the Tax Court, 127 a corporation is not
completely liquidated if (1) a substantial part of the assets directly owned
by the corporation (2) continue to be held by a corporation (3) that is
owned by substantially the same shareholders.' 28
The following hypothetical illustrates the potential of the foregoing
analysis upon a creeping asset acquisition. P purchases for cash all of the
issued and outstanding stock of T. Shortly thereafter T merges upstream
into P. Soon after the upstream merger, P transfers 5% of T's assets to S, a
newly created, wholly owned subsidiary of P. P treats the upstream
merger as a complete liquidation of T because T possesses net operating
loss carryovers that, if not inherited by P pursuant to section 381,' 29 will be
limited to the income of T or T's alter ego.' 30
With respect to the foregoing hypothetical, the government will appar-
ently adopt the position that T has not been completely liquidated. The
124. See I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982).
125. 63 T.C. at 433-35.
126. Id. (emphasis added); see also Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 41
(4th Cir. 1965) (if enterprise is continued in corporate form, old T shareholders must have
disassociated themselves from enterprise for T to be deemed completely liquidated).
127. Chief Judge Dawson and Judges Sterrett and Drennen dissented.
128. In Workman v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1534 (1977), Judge Raum prof-
fered that the assets referred to in TASCO were the "historic" business assets directly owned
by the corporation. Id at 1540. If the corporation sells all of its historic assets for a note and
distributes the note to its shareholder in complete liquidation, the subsequent transfer of the
note to a second corporation wholly owned by the same shareholder does not disqualify the
status of the first distribution as a complete liquidation. This analysis seems to overempha-
size the character of the assets retained in corporation solution.
129. I.R.C. § 381 (1982). After TEFRA any complete liquidation to which § 332 applies
qualifies as a transaction described in § 381(a). Id § 381(a)(1). Note, however, that T's net
operating loss carryovers are subject to disallowance under § 269(b) if the principal purpose
of the complete liquidation is tax avoidance. Id § 269(b).
130. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c) (1966), which would prevent P from using in a con-
solidated return any T loss carryovers arising in taxable years prior to the date on which T is
affiliated with P within the meaning of § 1504.
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government will treat S as a mere continuation of T, either under the
TASCO definition of complete liquidation or under the theory that the
transfer of 5% of T's assets to S constitutes a "reincorporation," an "F"
reorganization, described in section 368(a)(1)(F).131 The government's po-
sition, however, ignores the fact that P is not an "historic" shareholder of
T. The absence of historic shareholder continuity of proprietary interest
should prevent the transaction from qualifying as an F reorganization 32
and should also prevent the treatment of S as being a mere continuation of
T. 133 The careful practitioner, if consulted in time, will, of course, struc-
ture the transaction such that S purchases 5% of T's stock and P purchases
the balance. T would then adopt a plan of complete liquidation, distribut-
ing 5% of its assets to S and then merging upstream into P. Utilization of
this form of transaction ensures P's inheritance of T's tax attributes pursu-
ant to section 381, simply because the government has long acknowledged
that this form of transaction can only be a complete liquidation of T.134
An even greater tax disaster may result if S directly acquires substan-
tially all of T's assets after P has purchased T stock. For example, suppose
P purchases 90% of the T stock for cash. In order to eliminate the 10%
minority shareholder, P causes T to merge into S, pursuant to which the
minority shareholder receives cash and P stock. According to the Tax
Court, the merger of T into S merits treatment as a taxable sale of all of T's
assets, provided P planned the merger at the time that it acquired its 90%
interest in the T stock.' 35 On the other hand, if P did not intend to merge
T into S at the time that P acquired its 90% interest in the T stock, the Tax
Court will apparently treat a newly organized S as a mere continuation of
T. 136 T recognizes no gain or loss and is treated as having redeemed the T
stock held by the 10% minority shareholder. Needless to say, it is difficult
to understand why the Tax Court believes that the end result test applies
for purposes of determining whether the historic shareholders of T have
sufficient continuity of interest, whereas the end result test does not apply
for purposes of determining whether a post-merger sale of P stock must be
considered for continuity of interest purposes.' 37
To avoid with certainty the treatment of T as making a taxable sale of its
assets to S under the hypothetical set forth in the preceding paragraph, the
direction of the merger must merely be reversed. By merging S, a newly
created corporation, into T, with T surviving, even the government agrees
that the transaction merits treatment as a single purchase of the 10% mi-
131. See Rev. Rul. 76-429, 1976-2 C.B. 97; Rev. Rul. 69-617, 1969-2 C.B. 57; Technical
Advice Memorandum 7836002 (Apr. 28, 1978).
132. See Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168, 177 (1973).
133. See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1965); Workman v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M (CCH) 1534, 1540 (1977).
134. See Rev. Rul. 60-262, 1960-2 C.B. 114.
135. Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168, 176 (1973).
136. See Casco Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32, 37 (1967). For an excellent
comparison of Yoc Heating to Casco Products, see Levin & Bowen, supra note 20, at 477-80.
137. See McDonald's v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 997-98 (1981), rev'd sub noma. Mc-
Donald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
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nority shareholder's stock, not as a sale of T's assets.' 38
The foregoing indicates that, in the case of a creeping asset acquisition
in which all or a portion of T's assets are to be held by a subsidiary of P,
form remains a paramount concern under current law. Given the size of
the tax stakes usually involved, an overabundance of caution is required in
structuring such triangular acquisitions.
VI. CONCLUSION
A web of confusion continues to surround transactions in which one
corporation acquires the stock of a target corporation and thereafter ac-
quires all or a portion of the target's assets. This confusion is due in large
measure to the differing manners of application of the step-transaction
doctrine in the context of the reorganization and liquidation provisions. A
great deal of the confusion would be eliminated if the courts uniformly
agreed that (1) the same step-transaction test applies in the case of a creep-
ing asset acquisition, both for purposes of the liquidation provisions and
for purposes of the reorganization provisions; and (2) the end result test no
longer applies for purposes of determining whether a stock acquisition fol-
lowed by an asset acquisition should be tested as an asset reorganization.
Not only would such agreement end unnecessary ambiguity, the elimina-
tion of the end result test from this area of the law would represent a step
toward a fairer and more easily administered tax system.
Unfortunately, the end result test will apparently continue to be applied
by the courts in the context of the reorganization provisions. Congress's
repair of the breach in the system, therefore, is fortunate. P now may not
step up the basis of T's assets in those cases in which the T shareholders
are entitled, in whole or in part, to nonrecognition treatment of the transfer
of T stock to P. This change results from section 338(h)(3)(A), which
removes a creeping asset acquisition that qualifies as a good reorganization
under section 368(a) from the definition of a qualified stock purchase.
Since the amendment to section 338(h)(3)(A) by section 712(k)(5) of the
Act, the most significant problem resulting from a dual application of the
step-transaction doctrine is apparently solved. Other ambiguities in the
taxation of creeping asset acquisitions, however, appear unsusceptible to
legislative remedy. These include the manner in which the continuity of
proprietary interest test is applied in the context of an upstream merger of
an "old and cold" subsidiary having minority shareholders, the manner in
which the Bausch & Lomb doctrine applies, and problems resulting from
transfers of assets to one or more P subsidiaries after P acquires T's stock.
Although, in each instance, a "better view of the law" can be derived, the
absence of clear rules often either discourages transactions or forces tax-
payers to seek "acceptable" forms that may or may not accord with their
business goals.
138. See Rev. Rul. 73-427, 1973-2 C.B. 301.
1078 [Vol. 38
CREEPING ASSET ACQUISITIONS
In conclusion, under current law the following principles appear to gov-
ern the taxation of creeping asset acquisitions:
(1) The end result test is not applied for purposes of determining the
application of the complete liquidation provisions of the Code to
a creeping asset acquisition. Thus, assuming the courts continue
to apply the end result test in the context of the reorganization
provisions, a creeping asset acquisition can qualify for both reor-
ganization treatment and for nonrecognition treatment under
sections 332 and 336.
(2) With the possible exception of section 337, the reorganization
and complete liquidation provisions have concurrent jurisdiction
in most cases. Thus, for example, in the case of an upstream
merger of T into P, P recognizes no gain or loss if section 332
applies, even though P would otherwise recognize gain under the
reorganization provisions upon an exchange of P's T stock for T
assets. An exception to this general rule of concurrent jurisdic-
tion should be carved out for cases in which P and T are con-
trolled by substantially the same shareholders. In those cases the
reorganization provisions should preempt the liquidation
provisions.
(3) In a reor anization in which P owns T stock on an "old and
cold" basis, the continuity of proprietary interest requirement
should be applied by examining only the consideration flowing
to T shareholders other than P.
(4) For purposes of the reorganization provisions, T stock owned by
P on an "old and cold" basis should be treated as any other boot
property. Thus, if such T stock is exchanged by P for T assets
and section 332 does not apply to the transaction, P should rec-
ognize any gain or loss realized by P on the exchange of its T
stock for P assets, regardless of the form of the transaction.
Unfortunately, the foregoing principles do not address every problem that
may result from a creeping asset acquisition. For example, the principles
give no guidance as to the tax consequences to T upon a freeze-out merger
of T into a wholly owned subsidiary of P, following a cash purchase by P
of a majority of T's stock. Furthermore, even if the foregoing are, or be-
come, generally accepted by the courts, the area will still be fraught with
traps and planning potential. Perhaps the only general proposition that
can be derived from the foregoing is: no matter how much "simplifica-
tion" is visited upon the Code, subchapter C will remain a bastion of
"transactional selectivity."
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